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Views about the effects of taxes on corporate use of debt have evolved over time. The modern discussion dates back to Modigliani and Miller (1958) , who argued that fi rms should be indifferent between debt and equity fi nance, ignoring real costs of bankruptcy and ignoring taxes. Miller and Modigliani (1961) then emphasized that corporate tax provisions favor use of debt fi nance, since interest payments but not dividends are deductible expenses under the corporate tax. Firms, they argued, borrow to take advantage of the resulting tax savings, until the tax savings from further debt are just offset by extra costs resulting from a higher risk of bankruptcy. Later papers then emphasized that the offsetting non-tax costs arise not only during bankruptcy but also due to confl icts of interest among debt and equity holders in anticipation of the possibility of bankruptcy. Based on the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model for corporate use of debt, taxes lead to an excessive use of debt.
2 This theory is laid out in Section I. The corporate fi nance literature then focused on measuring to what degree taxes changed corporate use of debt versus equity fi nance. Many studies were undertaken. The basic fi nding was that taxes had at best modest effects on corporate fi nancial policy. 3 In fact, a common fi nding was that fi rms with tax losses if anything borrowed more than fi rms with taxable profi ts, even though their inability to make use of interest deductions to save on taxes should have led them to borrow less. Under the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model, taxes create larger effi ciency costs the more responsive corporate use of debt is to tax incentives. The modest effects of taxes on corporate fi nancial policy that have been found empirically imply that the effi ciency costs from the tax distortion favoring corporate use of debt are small.
More recent papers point out various biases that caused earlier studies to underestimate the role of taxes, however. For example, fi rms with tax losses (and tax loss carryforwards) may borrow more just because they have losses and therefore have greater need for supplementary funds to cover operating expenses. An indicator for the presence of tax losses captures the direct effects of losses on corporate use of debt, as well as the effects of these tax losses on the potential tax savings from additional interest deductions. As a result, the interpretation of the links between tax losses and corporate use of debt is unclear.
Two recent papers focus on a different means of identifying the role of taxes. The prior literature examined the behavior only of large corporations. If these fi rms earn a normal rate of return, they would all face the same corporate tax rate. Any crosssectional variation in tax incentives across fi rms would then come from variation in taxable income, so mainly from whether the fi rm has profi ts or losses, leading to the biased estimates. While time-series evidence could in principle be helpful, tax rates faced by large fi rms have varied too little over time to identify the size of their effects on behavior. By using panel data on small as well as larger corporations, however, more recent papers can identify the role of taxes by using differences in marginal tax rates across the corporate tax schedule. 4 The results suggest that taxes have statistically signifi cant and economically important effects on corporate use of debt. This research on estimating the responsiveness of corporate debt to taxes is summarized in Section II.
The next issue is estimating the magnitude of the effi ciency costs of the tax-induced use of corporate debt to judge whether the increased use of debt is a serious policy concern. Section III develops a standard measure of the effi ciency cost, which builds on the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs framework. The effi ciency gains from eliminating the tax distortion favoring use of debt fi nance are estimated to be trivial: roughly $1 billion to $2 billion per year, which is well under one percent of corporate tax revenue. While there are a variety of additional complications that can lead to some modifi cations to this estimate, all have relatively modest effects.
As a result, it is not surprising that this particular tax distortion has not been a major focus in policy discussions. The cuts in personal relative to corporate tax rates in 1986, for example, substantially exacerbated the tax distortion favoring use of debt versus equity fi nance. 5 Even if the effi ciency costs of the distortion are small, though, it still seems surprising that the distortion would have remained in place, and in fact grown during recent years, given the ease of reducing or eliminating the distortion.
How confi dent can we be, then, in these effi ciency cost calculations based on the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model? Under the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model, we expect that large corporations, who face the top corporate tax rate and so have the largest tax savings from interest deductions, should borrow much more than smaller fi rms, which face a lower corporate tax rate and so gain little from an equivalent dollar in interest deductions. The data strongly suggest the reverse, with small fi rms fi nancing a far higher fraction of their capital stock with debt than do larger fi rms.
6 That some of the most successful fi rms, such as IBM when this question fi rst arose in the literature and Microsoft now, have little or no debt even though they are the fi rms that could most surely save on taxes through interest deductions raises serious questions about what factors drive corporate decisions on use of debt.
Facing these puzzles in the data, Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that when corporations seek outside fi nance, investors learn that the fi rm needs funds. While this need for funds could be due to the fi rm having profi table investment opportunities (or opportunities to reduce tax liabilities), it equally well could be due to its being short of cash due to poor sales. As discussed in the literature (Eckbo, 1986; Howton, Howton, and Perfect, 1996; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986) stock prices fall when a fi rm announces new borrowing, suggesting that investors take this borrowing as bad news about the fi rm. If fi rms that borrow tend to be fi rms with poor future prospects, then the interest rates charged on the debt will also be high, refl ecting the resulting pessimism about the status of the fi rm. Given this impact of borrowing on stock prices and interest rates, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that fi rms with less pressing needs for cash (those who are doing well) will forego outside fi nance, even at the cost of foregoing some good investment projects. Only the weaker fi rms borrow. This is a classic example of a lemons problem, noted fi rst by Akerlof (1970) . Akerlof sought to explain why the price of a used car is so low. He hypothesized that those with a lousy car are much more likely to choose to sell, so that the equilibrium price of used 5 See Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1991) for evidence on the effects of the 1986 tax reform on corporate use of debt fi nance. The cut in personal tax rates during 2001-2002, in itself favoring debt fi nance, was offset by further cuts in the tax rates on dividends and capital gains, leaving little net change in the tax incentives on debt versus equity fi nance. 6 Gordon and Lee (2001) report average debt-to-capital ratios of 30 percent for fi rms with assets below $25 million, but only 17 percent for larger fi rms.
cars should be low. The problem is that car purchasers have incomplete information, and take the decision to sell a car as a bad signal about its quality. Those with good cars will then likely fi nd selling their car at such a low price unattractive, even if they have legitimate reasons to sell. By analogy, investors take the decision by a fi rm to borrow as a bad signal about the quality of the fi rm. The result is too little corporate borrowing, just as there is too little trade in used cars. Companies forego good projects rather than pay too high an interest rate on new loans. How should policy deal with such lemons problems? If there is too little trade in these markets, then policies that increase trade can generate effi ciency gains. This immediately suggests providing a subsidy to trade. However, a better answer is a subsidy to borrowing by better fi rms, and perhaps even a tax on borrowing by weaker fi rms. By increasing the fraction of new issues coming from good fi rms and reducing the fraction coming from poor fi rms, interest rates charged on these bonds will fall and more fi rms will choose to borrow. In theory, these subsidies and taxes should be designed to refl ect the externalities each borrower imposes on other borrowers, through changing the composition of borrowers that then determines market interest rates. This pattern of subsidies and taxes corresponds in many ways to what we now have in the tax law, with fi rms in the highest tax brackets saving taxes on net through borrowing while fi rms with tax losses paying more in taxes on net once we take into account the taxes paid by those receiving the interest payments.
Existing tax policy then looks much less puzzling under the Myers-Majluf (1984) model for use of debt. This model is described in Section IV, and its implications for the tax treatment of debt are analyzed in Section V.
The Myers-Majluf (1984) model is not the only alternative model for why fi rms borrow. Section VI describes more briefl y two other models for debt fi nance: an agency cost model as initially described by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) , and the signaling model developed by Ross (1977) . In each case, the effi ciency implications of tax distortions are described. The section then reports on the consistency of the empirical evidence with these two models, and their implications for the effi ciency costs of the existing tax distortions favoring use of debt fi nance.
The above discussion focused on the implications of tax policy for fi rms operating solely in the domestic economy. The effects of tax policy on multinationals bring in a variety of different considerations. These are outlined briefl y in Section VII.
Section VIII then provides a brief summary of the weight of the evidence concerning the effi ciency effects of the existing tax treatment of corporate debt.
I. TAXES VERSUS BANKRUPTCY COSTS
To what degree do taxes distort a corporation's choice between debt and equity fi nance? To judge this, consider the implications for tax payments by both the fi rm and its investors when the fi rm borrows an additional dollar in debt. Assume that it uses the proceeds to pay extra dividends or to repurchase some existing equity and will adjust future payouts to shareholders in the same proportion between dividends and repurchases so as to leave real investment unchanged.
With a dollar of extra payouts to shareholders, the immediate effect of this change in policy is extra cash receipts by shareholders equal to $1(1 -t e ), where t e is the effective personal tax rate on these payouts, based on the fraction of the dollar used to fi nance extra dividends versus share repurchases.
In each future period, the fi rm has reduced net-of-tax cash fl ow equal to i(1 -τ), where i denotes the interest rate. In addition, with extra debt it faces the threat of higher bankruptcy and agency costs each period. Denote the resulting overall pre-tax certainty-equivalent cost each period by C(d,X)K, where the function C measures the cost per dollar of capital generated by a debt-to-capital ratio different from the value that minimizes real agency and bankruptcy costs, d = D/K is the fi rm's debt-to-capital ratio, D is the fi rm's overall debt, K represents the fi rm's capital stock, while X captures any other factors (e.g., those that are industry-specifi c) that affect the size of real costs to a fi rm from varying its debt levels. Assume that C is a convex function of d, with a minimum value when d = d*. Taxes will then induce the fi rm to choose a debt-to-capital ratio different from the value d* that minimizes costs.
When the fi rm borrows an extra dollar, the available cash fl ow to the fi rm falls by (i + C d )(1 -τ) in each future period. This reduction in the fi rm's cash fl ow reduces the funds available each period for dividends or share repurchases, leading to a fall in the net-of-tax income to shareholders of (1 -t e )(i + C d )(1 -τ).
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In discounting to the present all of these future reductions in payouts to shareholders, we discount at the shareholders' opportunity cost of funds. Shareholders can invest in either bonds or equity, and would choose a portfolio so that they are indifferent between the two at the margin. We can therefore use either rate of return as the discount rate, and for convenience use the after-tax rate of return available on bonds. This net-oftax rate of return equals i(1 -m), where m is the tax rate the investors face on interest income. Given this discount rate, the present value of the decline in future payouts to shareholders resulting from a dollar in extra debt equals (1 -t e ) ∫ 0
The shareholders are then indifferent to an extra dollar of debt when the initial increase in cash receipts just equals the present value of the future drop in payouts, or
The higher are nominal interest rates or the higher is the corporate tax rate relative to the personal tax rate on interest income, the stronger are the tax incentives to increase borrowing, leading to a higher value for d.
The effective tax rate that would have been paid on any such payouts is again assumed to equal t e . 8 Note that the tax rate on dividends or capital gains, t e , does not enter this expression. The logic fundamentally is the same as that in Auerbach (1979) . Either the fi rm pays out funds now or reduces borrowing and pays funds out later, but regardless the funds are ultimately subject to the same personal tax rate.
What can we say about the size of this tax distortion, and how it varies across fi rms and over time? The corporate tax rate τ represents the marginal tax rate on future income accruing to the fi rm. By statute, this marginal tax rate depends on the fi rm's taxable income, denoted by π, so that we can express the fi rm's marginal tax rate by τ(π). Under current statutes, marginal corporate tax rates vary from 35 percent for fi rms with high incomes to zero for fi rms with tax losses extending into the indefi nite future. The whole schedule has changed frequently over time, even though the top corporate rate has changed much less often.
We can then express taxable income by π ≡ (ρ ∼ -id)K, where ρ ∼ represents the fi rm's ex post taxable rate of return. The corporate tax rate therefore varies across fi rms and across time due not only to differences in statutes, but also to differences in K, d, i, and ρ ∼ . In the next section, we focus on the implications of using each of these sources of variation when trying to estimate the effects of taxes on corporate fi nancial policy.
The tax rate, m, represents the personal tax rate on interest income faced by the fi rm's shareholders. This raises the immediate complication that shareholders are heterogeneous, and can be in very different personal tax brackets, assuming they are taxable at all. There have been various papers that explore how best to capture the personal tax incentives driving fi rm behavior. Miller (1977) provides a model in which investors divide into clienteles based on their personal tax rate, with those in higher tax brackets investing in stocks or municipal bonds and those in lower tax brackets buying taxable bonds. Within this model, the tax rate that drives fi rm behavior is that of the investor who is just indifferent between taxable and municipal bonds. Gordon and Bradford (1980) develop an alternative model in which all investors buy bonds and stocks, but in different proportions depending on their tax incentives and risk aversion. Here, the tax rate that drives fi rm behavior is a weighted average of the tax rates faced by all investors, with weights depending on their wealth (and degree of risk aversion). Both approaches have been used in the past literature in coming up with a plausible estimate for m.
Interest rates can also vary by fi rm, depending on the risks of default. Plausibly, they then depend on both d and ρ ∼ , raising endogeneity problems. Interest rates also vary over time, though, providing a useful supplementary source of identifi cation.
II. EVIDENCE ON BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO TAX INCENTIVES
How responsive are actual corporate fi nancial choices to taxes? Empirical tests have focused on both time-series and cross-sectional evidence. Time-series evidence alone proved to be insuffi cient since tax incentives for large fi rms have been very stable over time, providing too little variation to identify the effects of taxes on corporate use of debt. In addition, many other factors change over time, obscuring any tax effects.
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The cross-sectional evidence made use of variation in tax incentives across fi rms at a particular date. Most of the past empirical work used Compustat data, which provides income and balance sheet information for publicly traded fi rms in the United States. Within this data set, all fi rms are large enough so that they face the top corporate tax rate unless their profi t rate is unusually low. Therefore, variation in K was not a useful source of identifi cation.
The empirical work therefore focused on the implications of variation in π for tax incentives, and then the effects of this variation in tax incentives on corporate fi nancial policy. Effects of variation in π for tax incentives was captured in many ways, including indicators for tax loss carryforwards and measures of the size of "non-debt tax shields," which represent key deductions (mainly depreciation) other than interest payments.
10 A more ambitious approach (as in Graham (1996) for example) involved simulating the future distribution of values of π, and then calculating the effective tax rate taking account of tax-loss carryforwards and carrybacks. Using these identifi cation procedures, little evidence was found for any important tax effects on corporate use of debt fi nance. Often the estimated coeffi cients had the "wrong" sign, since fi rms with tax losses commonly borrowed more than fi rms with profi ts.
That fi rms with tax losses borrow heavily is not surprising, of course, since these fi rms face fi nancial pressures to seek outside funding to help cover essential current expenses. Firms needing extra funds can borrow from banks or issue commercial paper or corporate bonds much more easily than they can issue new equity. Formally, the problem is that π can have direct effects on a fi rm's use of debt, and not simply serve as a proxy for the fi rm's effective corporate tax rate. This source of variation in tax incentives therefore does not provide a convincing source of identifi cation.
Two recent studies Lee, 2001, 2007) have shifted to a different source of data, the Statistics of Income, which provides income and balance sheet information for all corporations fi ling tax returns in each year. The data are subdivided into roughly 15 size categories, based on each fi rm's total assets. This data set provides much more variation in fi rm size than is available in the Compustat data. It also covers a longer time period, providing more of a chance to make use of time-series evidence.
With this data set, identifi cation can be based on variation in K across size categories of fi rms combined with variation in statutory tax schedules over time. Note, though, that variation in K alone is not suffi cient for identifi cation, since small fi rms can have very different fi nancial policies because they have less access to the equity market. To identify tax effects therefore requires controlling fl exibly for any direct effects of K on fi rm behavior. These papers then estimate tax effects by examining the degree to which borrowing by fi rms of a particular size changes over time as their tax incentives change.
11 While tax incentives for fi rms with high profi ts were relatively stable over the sample period, tax incentives for fi rms with low profi ts varied substantially, providing suffi cient information to identify tax effects.
Results suggested nontrivial effects of taxes on behavior. For example, the coeffi cient estimates in Gordon and Lee (2007) reported in column 3 of their Table 2, suggest that shifting from the average tax distortion to no tax distortion would reduce debt-to-capital ratios by 0.022, implying that an additional 2.2 percent of capital would be fi nanced with equity rather than debt. 12 The estimates in Gordon and Lee (2001) , using a somewhat different specifi cation, suggest over twice as large a response, with a reduction in the debt-to-capital ratio of 0.047 if tax distortions were eliminated.
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The theory also forecasts that behavioral responses should be proportional to nominal interest rates. Gordon and Lee (2007) do in fact fi nd clear support for tax effects being larger in years with higher nominal interest rates, with very large effects in the years with the highest nominal rates and essentially no effect in years with the lowest nominal rates.
III. ESTIMATES OF EFFICIENCY COSTS: TAXES VERSUS BANKRUPTCY MODEL
If we accept that the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model explains observed corporate choices for debt-to-equity ratios, then it is straightforward to make use of the above estimates to calculate the effi ciency gains from eliminating existing tax distortions to corporate fi nancial policies. The key assumption is that corporate fi nancial policies would be effi cient if there were no tax distortions affecting these choices.
For any small change in tax policy, the resulting excess burden can be measured based on the resulting change in government tax revenue caused by any behavioral changes.
14 If tax policies change so as to induce fi rms to increase their use of debt fi nance by a dollar, then individuals pay additional taxes on the dollar of extra payouts to shareholders. In addition, in each future period, corporate tax payments fall due to the extra deductions for interest expense and extra possible bankruptcy costs, while individuals receive interest income instead of dividends or capital gains. The present value of the resulting changes in government revenue equal 
Making use of (2), it is easy to show that this expression simplifi es to
These results are based on a year with average interest rates. 13 This estimate is based on the coeffi cient estimates in column 3 of Table 5. 14 Ignoring behavioral changes, any change in tax payments by individuals or fi rms just equals the increase in tax payments received by the government. These effects of a tax change involve redistribution, but no effi ciency costs. In addition, though, fi rms and individuals can change behavior in response to the tax change. While individuals and fi rms should be virtually indifferent at the margin when they change behavior in response to a small tax change, since otherwise they wouldn't have waited for the tax change to alter their behavior, the government experiences a change in its tax revenue. This change in tax revenue then measures the net cost to individuals and the government together resulting from the change in tax policy.
or equivalently to a loss of i(τ -m)/(1 -τ) ≡ iT* in each future period. This, of course, is just what we should have expected. The real loss from a dollar of extra debt in a period equals C d . As seen from (2), in equilibrium C d = iT*. How would we then calculate the overall effi ciency gains if we were to eliminate this tax distortion entirely? 15 The overall gain in effi ciency from entirely eliminating the tax distortion to corporate fi nancial policy, assuming all fi rms face the same changes in incentives, equals
Note that the second expression follows if the size of the behavioral response does not depend on T.
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Calculating this expression is straightforward. We report above, for example, estimates ranging from 0.022 to 0.047 for the size of the reduction in the debt-to-capital ratio resulting from reducing the average tax distortion to zero. This fi gure corresponds (5) then equals 0.5iT*KΔ. The average value of T* reported in Gordon and Lee (2007) is 0.46. According to the Economic Report of the President (2007), the value of shareholders' equity as of the third quarter of 2006 was $2.7 trillion dollars. With an average debt-to-capital ratio reported in Gordon and Lee (2007) of 0.26, this leads to an estimate of the corporate capital stock (evaluated at market prices) of 2.7/(1-.26) = $3.6 trillion. Given these fi gures and a typical market interest rate of i ≈ 0.06, the value of expression (5) is $1.1 billion, assuming Δ = 0.022, and $2.3 billion assuming Δ = 0.046. To put this fi gure in context, overall revenue from the corporate tax in 2006 was $353.9 billion. The effi ciency loss is therefore one-third to two-thirds of a percent of corporate tax revenue.
These fi gures alone suggest that the tax distortions to corporate fi nancial policy are not an important consideration when setting tax policy. To what degree, though, might these fi gures underestimate the costs of these distortions? One omission is that tax incentives vary by fi rm, creating misallocations as well as an average distortion. According to the fi gures in Gordon and Lee (2007) , the average tax distortion was 0.46, but this tax distortion ranged from 0.01 to 0.92 across fi rms of different sizes and dates. If we assume that this tax distortion has a uniform distribution over this interval, then the average value of (T*) 2 turns out to be a third larger than the value of (T*) 2 evaluated at the average T*.
Another omission is that the size of the tax distortion depends on the value of nominal interest rates. The above calculations were calculated assuming interest rates equal their average value during the sample period 1954-2000. The maximum values for nominal interest rates during this period were roughly 2.5 times as high. In those years, the estimated effi ciency losses from existing taxes would then be 2.5 times as large in dollar terms, and probably a yet higher fraction of corporate tax revenue given the loss in revenue from the higher interest deductions. Currently, however, nominal interest rates are substantially below their average values during the sample period, reducing tax distortions proportionately.
The above fi gures also ignore any effects of a tax reform on behavior other than corporate fi nancial policies. Other behavioral responses also have effi ciency consequences to the degree that taxes distort these other decisions. The obvious response to focus on is corporate investment. The implications for corporate investment would depend on precisely how the tax distortions to corporate fi nancial policy were eliminated. If these tax distortions were eliminated by eliminating both the deductibility of interest payments and the taxation of interest income under the personal and corporate tax while holding statutory tax rates unchanged, this would lead to an increase in the effective tax rate on corporate investment. Assuming that the existing tax structure discourages corporate investment, this implies an offsetting effi ciency loss from eliminating the tax distortion favoring corporate use of debt fi nance. The quantitative importance of this offsetting effect can be debated, 18 but its presence certainly undermines further any case for focusing on reducing existing distortions to corporate fi nancial policy.
Note, though, that tax reforms that eliminate the deductibility of corporate interest payments often leave in place a tax penalty to interest income under the personal income tax. The result would be a shift from a tax subsidy to debt to a tax penalty, and one of roughly equal absolute value. Effi ciency costs arising from distortions to sources of fi nance would then be little affected, but debt-equity ratios could change noticeably.
IV. ALTERNATIVE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICIES
These calculations, however, are not the end of the story. They are correct only if corporate use of debt would be effi cient if there were no tax distortions. This assumption has been questioned in the more recent literature on corporate fi nance. The questioning initially focused on a variety of inconsistencies between the forecasts from the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs theory and observed corporate use of debt.
According to the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs theory, debt is favored to the extent that τ > m for a fi rm, and conversely. As a result, we should expect to see less use of debt by fi rms facing lower effective corporate tax rates. Given the progressive rate structure under the corporate tax, and the lack of full loss offset, small fi rms and larger fi rms with tax losses face much lower effective corporate tax rates than do larger profi table fi rms. By the theory, these fi rms should then borrow less. 18 Gordon, Kalambokidis, and Slemrod (2004a) fi nd that tax payments under existing taxes are virtually identical overall to what would occur if we shifted to expensing of business investment and eliminated any taxation of fi nancial income from capital (and any interest deductions), thereby eliminating all marginal distortions to savings and business investment. Gordon, Kalambokidis, and Slemrod (2004b) then argue that these small revenue effects imply a small effective tax rate on business investment.
The data very much show the reverse. According to the fi gures reported in Gordon and Lee (2001) , fi rms with assets larger than $25 million dollars fi nanced only 17 percent of their assets with debt, whereas remaining fi rms fi nanced roughly 30 percent of their assets with debt. The earlier empirical work found if anything that fi rms with tax losses had the same or slightly more use of debt than did profi table fi rms. Graham (2000) fi nds among publicly traded fi rms (those in the Compustat data set) that they and their investors could have saved additional taxes equal on average to at least 7.3 percent of fi rm value through expanding the use of debt fi nance. The fi rms that most forego these opportunities to save on taxes tend to be large, profi table, liquid, and in stable industries, making their behavior particularly puzzling.
In addition, while the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model implies that bankruptcy costs should be high enough at the margin to offset any tax savings from extra debt, it is hard to fi nd potential bankruptcy costs anywhere near this large in the data. For example, Warner (1977) could document ex-post bankruptcy costs in a sample of large railroad bankruptcies equal to only 1 percent of the market value of the fi rms seven years prior to bankruptcy. This fi gure is virtually an order of magnitude less than the foregone tax savings from extra use of debt fi nance, even assuming that the subsequent bankruptcy becomes certain. While high levels of debt also generate extra real costs due to increased confl icts of interest between debt and equity, as for example emphasized by Jenson and Meckling (1976) , extra costs of the magnitude needed to explain the foregone tax savings seem implausible.
A further puzzling observation is that share prices fall when a fi rm unexpectedly announces new borrowing. 19 Under the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model, fi rms choose their debt levels to maximize the utility of shareholders, so that shareholders should be indifferent to any marginal changes in debt levels.
Another puzzle, given the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model, was the sizeable use of debt fi nance in the early twentieth century, before tax distortions should have played any role. Taggart (1985) documents that debt-to-equity ratios were higher then than they were during many of the intervening years. Myers and Majluf (1984) provide an intriguing explanation for these various observations, based on a "lemons" model for corporate borrowing. The lemons model dates back to Akerlof (1970) , who used it to explain the low prices and small volume of trade in the market for used cars. Akerlof's hypothesis is that people are much more likely to try to sell their car if it is a lemon, and thus performing poorly. Buyers may not be able to determine the quality of a car by visual inspection, so instead infer from the fact that the current owner wants to sell it that the car is likely to have problems.
Similarly, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that lenders cannot easily judge the likelihood that a fi rm is doing well and will repay its debts, or doing poorly and likely to 19 Chaplinsky and Hansen (1993) and Howton, Howton, and Perfect (1996) provide evidence on the immediate impact of an unexpected debt issue on stock prices. Spiess and Aftleck-Graves (1999) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2000) provide evidence that the longer run drop in stock prices in response to a new debt issue is even larger than the observed short run response.
default. 20 Facing the same interest rate, fi rms that are doing badly may be more inclined to borrow since it is less likely that they will end up repaying this debt, and also since they are more pressed for funds to cover current day-to-day expenses. If true, this implies that the set of fi rms that borrow tends to be lower quality fi rms. Not knowing the true quality of any particular fi rm, lenders need to charge a higher interest rate in order to protect themselves against the possibility that the fi rm borrowing money is in fact a lemon. Firms that are doing well can then fi nd the high interest rates unattractive to the point that they may forego borrowing even at the cost of foregoing good projects or foregoing sizeable tax benefi ts.
This model immediately provides an explanation for why fi rms doing badly, who turn out to have tax losses, are the ones more likely to borrow. Myers and Majluf (1984) also use their model to explain the greater use of debt by smaller fi rms. They argued that these potential lemons problems are far more serious when fi rms use equity rather than debt fi nance, since then outside investors need to worry not just about the possibility of default but also about the entire distribution of possible returns. Outside investors will know much less about the situation of small fi rms than of large fi rms, given the economies of scale in collecting information on a fi rm. With greater asymmetric information for small fi rms, small fi rms will primarily use debt fi nance, if they raise outside fi nance at all.
This model also implies that share prices will fall in response to an unexpected use of debt fi nance, as seen in the data. In addition, real bankruptcy costs play no role in the model. Therefore, the insignifi cance of such costs in the data is entirely consistent with the model. The model also helps make sense of the sizeable use of debt in the early twentieth century, since this was a period in which lemons problems were undoubtedly more important than they are now, given more recent improvements in the quality of the information transmitted through fi nancial markets. As a result, the model is much more consistent with the data than is the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model.
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Within this lemons model for use of debt fi nance, taxes can still affect choices. As in the earlier model, fi rms with τ > m are encouraged to borrow in order to take advantage of the resulting tax savings, while fi rms with τ < m will be discouraged from borrowing, everything else equal. The empirical work that fi nds such behavioral responses can then be consistent as well with this lemons model, as long as it controls adequately for the other factors affecting borrowing decisions. The key additional control needed under the lemons model is an indicator of the severity of the asymmetric information problems. The natural control here is fi rm size, a control already used in the prior studies.
The main difference between the lemons model and the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model is in the calculation of effi ciency effects. In order to demonstrate the possible effi ciency effects of existing tax distortions favoring use of debt fi nance, the following section considers a variant of a lemons model.
V. LEMONS MODEL OF CORPORATE USE OF DEBT FINANCE
Consider the borrowing decisions made by a set of fi rms all of which look identical to outside investors but differ in their true value and in the marginal product of any additional investment, given whatever investment is feasible out of internal funds. Following Myers and Majluf (1984) , assume that any outside fi nance will take the form of debt rather than equity.
Firms must decide whether or not to borrow from outside investors, and if they borrow how much to borrow. Shareholders require an expected rate of return of r(1 -m) on any bonds they buy. The interest rate charged on such loans equals i, which is set so that lenders break even in expectation, that is r = iρ, where ρ is the equilibrium fraction of the contractual interest that in fact is repaid and r is the risk-free market interest rate. To simplify the derivations, assume that i does not depend on the amount borrowed.
Funds, B, that are borrowed are in part used to fi nance extra capital, but can also in part be paid out directly to shareholders. Assume that αB equals the amount paid out directly to shareholders, while the rest of the amount borrowed is invested. 22 The amount received by shareholders earns a rate of return of r(1 -m) when invested in the fi nancial markets.
Each fi rm is run by a manager who has inside information about ṽ, which represents one component of the fi rm's cash fl ow. The objective of the manager is to maximize the ex-post profi ts accruing to the fi rm's shareholders. These net profi ts equal
Here, ε is a second random component to profi ts not known by the manager when she makes decisions. The fi rm repays the promised amount iB as long as it has the funds. Otherwise, it pays out all of its net-of-tax cash fl ow to lenders. Outside lenders know K and can monitor that (1 -α)B was in fact invested.
The manager chooses B so as to maximize (6), subject to the constraint that the amount borrowed must be non-negative. 23 Let P(B|ṽ) denote the probability that the loan is fully repaid (e.g. P(ε > iB -π -ṽ)), based on the information available to the manager.
The fi rst-order condition for B can be expressed as 22 Equivalently, fi rms would have invested αB of their own funds if they chose not to borrow, but instead pay out these funds to shareholders if they do borrow. 23 If the fi rm instead lends money, then it would earn the interest rate r rather than i. For simplicity, we ignore the possibility that fi rms choose to lend money at this lower interest rate.
where the equation is satisfi ed with equality whenever B > 0. The fi rst term on the righthand side of (7) simply equals the interest rate charged on corporate debt, i. The term inside the parentheses measures the degree to which any given fi rm has a probability of repaying in full that differs from the average repayment rate on the loan market as a whole. 24 The higher is its default rate, the stronger are its incentives to borrow. Finally, the last term measures the effects of taxes on corporate use of debt. Taxes again encourage debt to the extent that τ > m. 25 The cost of capital varies across fi rms simply due to variation in P. The more likely the fi rm will default, the lower is P and the smaller is the cost of capital. Among fi rms that borrow, therefore, fi rms with a lower ṽ borrow more, and end up with a lower equilibrium value for π '. Firms with a high enough value for ṽ will fi nd the cost of capital too high to justify any borrowing.
We therefore fi nd a misallocation of capital, with good (high ṽ) fi rms ending up with too little capital relative to bad (low ṽ) fi rms. Bad fi rms borrow more since the cost is low, given that they are unlikely to repay the debt. On effi ciency grounds, in contrast, fi rms should invest until π ' = r. For plausible parameter values, the worst fi rms can even end up investing in value-reducing projects, where π ' < r.
In principle, tax policy can then be used to reduce the misallocation of capital among fi rms. Allocations among fi rms would be effi cient if the expression on the right-hand side of (7) equals r, regardless of P, where r = iρ. Solving for the value of T* that generates such an effi cient allocation, we fi nd that
Assume, for example, that ρ ≈ 0.75, so that the interest rate on corporate borrowing is a third higher than the risk-free rate. Assume, lacking empirical support, that α ≈ 0.2, so that shareholders can immediately remove 20 percent of the amount borrowed from the assets available as implicit collateral for the lenders. Then the value of T* that induces an effi cient level of investment is 0.67 for the safest fi rms (when P = 1), but equals 0.067 for a fi rm with a 60 percent chance of not repaying the debt in full (when P = 0.4). This compares with a mean value for T* in the Gordon and Lee (2007) data set of 0.46, ranging across fi rms from 0.01 to 0.92. To what degree can the tax law approximate such a tax schedule, imposing a much higher marginal tax rate on good fi rms than on bad fi rms? One crude way to do this is through no-loss-offset provisions. Firms with a worse value of P are more likely to face binding no-loss-offset provisions, and thus face a lower effective value of τ and hence a lower T*.
Asymmetric information is likely to be a much more severe problem for smaller fi rms than for larger fi rms. Note that fi rms with profi ts below $75,000 face a lower marginal corporate tax rate than do fi rms with higher profi ts. If the small fi rms likely to have access to outside credit have expected profi ts around $75,000, then those fi rms that are in fact better than average will face a much higher value of τ than those that are worse than average. Good fi rms are then encouraged to borrow by the tax law, whereas weak fi rms may even be discouraged from borrowing. Larger fi rms in contrast face a constant value of τ over a much wider range of their possible incomes, leading to less of a differential impact on the borrowing of good relative to bad fi rms, as would be appropriate if there is less asymmetric information for these fi rms.
This lemons model therefore forecasts that a number of existing provisions in the tax law might have some benefi cial effects. In particular, no-loss-offset provisions and the progressive rate schedule under the corporate tax may both help to discourage borrowing by fi rms expecting to do badly, 26 and to encourage borrowing by fi rms expecting to do well. In both cases, this helps alleviate the allocation problems arising from asymmetric information.
VI. ADDITIONAL MODELS OF CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURES
While the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs and the lemons models have both received substantial attention within the corporate fi nance literature, they are by no means the only models of the determinants of corporate leverage that have been explored. This section describes more briefl y two other models that have been taken seriously in the academic literature, to assess their consistency with the evidence, and then to sketch their implications for the measurement of the excess burden generated by the existing tax treatment of interest income and interest payments. To anticipate the discussion, both models generate a number of counterfactual forecasts, and seem dominated by the "lemons" model given the available evidence.
A. Agency-Cost Models of Debt Finance
One alternative model, fi rst proposed by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) , focuses on an agency problem within the fi rm. Managers, they argue, want to build an empire, and so choose to invest more than is in the interests of shareholders. Specifically, if the fi rm has "free cash fl ow," managers will choose to invest more of these funds than is in the interests of shareholders. Shareholders, acting perhaps through the Board of Directors, should respond by reducing the fi rm's free cash fl ow. They can do this for example through dividend payments.
27 They can also do it through inducing the fi rm to borrow more, and then encouraging the fi rm to use the borrowed funds to repurchase equity. By saddling the fi rm with future interest payments, managers are left with less free cash fl ow, reducing wasteful investment.
Under this model, we should expect to see more use of debt in: (1) publicly-traded (large) fi rms, where shareholders have a harder time monitoring managers so where agency problems are worse, (2) more profi table fi rms, with greater cash fl ow that can potentially be wasted, and (3) fi rms with lower amounts of profi table investment, implying less need to leave any cash within the fi rm.
These forecasts are all contradicted by the data. As noted above, small fi rms rely far more on debt fi nance than do large fi rms. As reported in more detail in Graham (2000) and Fama and French (2002) , more profi table fi rms are less leveraged, everything else equal, rather than more leveraged. Firms that invest more are more leveraged, as documented for example in many of the empirical studies cited above, where leverage ratios are found to be higher in fi rms with more depreciable capital. Note that all three of these patterns in the data are consistent with the Myers-Majluf (1984) model.
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Nonetheless, if the agency-cost model were the appropriate description of the determinants of corporate fi nancial policy, how should the effi ciency costs of the existing tax treatment of corporate interest payments be measured? Under the agency-cost model, shareholders choose a level of debt fi nance to maximize fi rm values. This would also be the effi cient level of debt from an effi ciency perspective. To a fi rst approximation, the effi ciency costs arising from the current tax treatment of debt would be measured in the same way as in the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model, where debt levels were also chosen effi ciently ignoring taxes.
This isn't the end of the story. At the margin, shareholders face a cost from reducing free cash fl ow, due to the added potential costs of bankruptcy. Free cash fl ow may be reduced without these offsetting real costs, though, through an added tax on corporate cash fl ow, such as a corporate surtax. Tax payments then go up when cash fl ow is high, and waste would be high, and may even fall (due to tax loss carrybacks) when cash fl ow is low and the fi rm might face a risk of default. The tax therefore not only reduces excess investment but can even potentially reduce the chance of default. This corporate surtax should be confi ned to fi rms with important agency problems, such as publicly traded fi rms. The existing tax code may approximate this, through the use of a higher corporate tax rate on more profi table fi rms.
B. Signaling Model of Debt Finance
Yet another alternative model, proposed originally by Ross (1977) , argues that a fi rm agrees to saddle itself with debt in order to signal to outside investors that the fi rm is confi dent that it will have suffi cient cash fl ow in order to service this debt. When fi rms engage in more borrowing, they trade-off the gain from convincing investors that the fi rm is doing better, leading to a jump in share prices, with the cost from being left with less internal cash-fl ow, forcing a cut-back in desired projects. The signaling model then forecasts that fi rms with greater cash fl ow and less investment needs will fi nd it easier to signal and so take on extra debt. In addition, fi rms for which outside investors are less well informed would have a stronger incentive to signal. When a fi rm does signal, share prices should rise.
How do these forecasts match up with the data? The fi rst two forecasts are both counterfactual. Contrary to these models, fi rms with greater cash fl ow do not have higher leverage ratios, while fi rms that invest less have lower rather than higher leverage ratios. Which fi rms face less well-informed outside investors, creating more of a price response to signaling? Presumably, outside investors are less well informed about the profi tability of smaller fi rms, given the economies to scale in the collection of information. Smaller fi rms should then use more debt fi nance, consistent with the data. The heart of the signaling model, though, is that the signal should generate a jump in share prices. As noted above, the evidence here contradicts this forecast. Unexpected increases in the use of debt have been found to lead to a drop in share prices.
Nonetheless, if the signaling model were correct, what can we say about the effi ciency effects of the current tax treatment of interest payments and income? Under the signaling model, the fi rm accepts real costs through reduced investment in order to signal its profi tability to the market. As argued by Spence (1973) in the context of education as a signal, effi ciency would improve if the overall costs of signaling could be reduced, holding fi xed the information conveyed. This would occur in the context of education if people in equilibrium "waste" fewer years acquiring education as a signal. In our context, the overall costs would be reduced if in equilibrium fi rms use less debt, while still successfully signaling their profi tability to outside investors.
Starting from a setting with no tax distortions, the use of debt as a signal would be reduced if investors were taxed on their interest income. Additional debt then implies not only foregone investment but also extra tax costs to investors. These combined costs are again traded off with the benefi ts resulting from the associated increase in the fi rm's share price arising from the signal. By adding a tax cost, the equilibrium signal is smaller and the overall marginal cost of the signal is higher, but the marginal cost from foregone investment is smaller. As a result, the effi ciency loss arising from the foregone investment is smaller, so that overall effi ciency increases. In contrast, if fi rms receive a tax savings as a result of their interest payments, equilibrium use of debt increases to the point that equilibrium investment falls, in spite of the reduced corporate tax payments; equilibrium marginal benefi ts from debt are higher so that equilibrium marginal costs resulting from foregone investment should be higher.
The benefi ts from reducing the current tax subsidy to debt are then larger than in the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model, and there would even be effi ciency benefi ts from replacing these subsidies with some net tax on the use of debt. As a result, the current tax treatment of debt seems particularly puzzling if the signaling model were true, providing further evidence against this model.
VII. TAXES AND BORROWING BY MULTINATIONALS
The analysis above focuses on external borrowing decisions by U.S. domestic fi rms. Additional borrowing not only has implications for tax payments by the fi rm and its creditors but also affects possible bankruptcy related costs and may signal information about the fi rm to investors. In addition, given lemons problems, only those who have a higher risk of default may in fact choose to borrow.
A different set of issues arises when considering the internal borrowing decisions made within a multinational fi rm, with one subsidiary borrowing from the parent fi rm or from a different subsidiary. When subsidiaries are located in different countries, such internal borrowing affects the overall taxes owed by the multinational. 29 There are tax savings whenever a subsidiary in a higher-tax country borrows from one in a lower-tax country. Such internal debt does not involve any transactions with outside creditors, and thus raises none of the offsetting non-tax costs discussed above. In particular, there are no bankruptcy related costs as long as the risk of bankruptcy depends on the overall debt position of the multinational as a whole. The interest rate paid to outside creditors is not directly relevant when setting an interest rate on internal debt. There is no signal of an overall shortage or surplus of funds within the multinational, given the lack of transactions with outside creditors. With no obvious non-tax costs from this tax arbitrage, we should expect internal borrowing behavior to be extremely responsive to tax rate differences.
The empirical evidence suggests that these internal borrowing decisions are very responsive to relative tax rates in the different countries in which a multinational operates, particularly when subsidiaries are fully owned by the parent fi rm. Specifi c estimates for the elasticity vary: Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008) fi nd that a 10 percent increase in the corporate tax rate faced by European multinationals raises a subsidiary's debt by 2.4 percent of capital, Desai, Foley, Hines (2004) estimate a higher response of 3.5 percent of capital for United States multinationals, while Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) estimate a yet higher response of 5.6 percent of capital for fully owned subsidiaries of German multinationals. These fi gures contrast with the estimates in Lee (2001, 2007 ) that a 10 percent increase in corporate tax rates in the United States would raise the debt-to-capital ratio of domestic fi rms from 1.0 percent to 2.2 percent of corporate capital.
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That purely internal use of debt is more responsive to taxes than is external debt is not surprising. The surprise instead is that the response is as limited as is found in the data. 29 Income from subsidiaries all within the United States, in contrast, is consolidated for tax purposes if cross-ownership is at least 80 percent, implying no net effects on federal revenues from internal borrowing within the United States. State corporate tax liabilities are also unaffected by such internal borrowing, since under formula apportionment the tax base equals a fraction of national consolidated income, where the fraction depends on the location of capital, payroll, or sales, but is not affected by internal borrowing. 30 Their sample includes multinationals located in the United States, which presumably have larger behavioral responses to tax incentives than do purely domestic fi rms. Thus, the implied estimate of the behavioral response by purely domestic fi rms would be even lower.
One hypothesis for the limited response may be that the subsidiaries in high-tax-rate countries cannot reduce their tax liabilities further, due to no-loss-offset restrictions. Another hypothesis is that reported profi ts of each subsidiary may have real effects, since the same fi gures reported to the tax authorities may need to be used in compensation schemes for employees in the subsidiary. A third hypothesis is that bankruptcy-related costs may depend not only on the overall debt-to-capital ratio of the multinational as a whole but also on the debt-to-capital ratio of each subsidiary, as would be the case if the parent fi rm does not guarantee the debts of each subsidiary. Regardless of which of these hypotheses explains why internal use of debt does not respond even more to differences in tax rates across subsidiaries, the fi rm's choice would be effi cient from the perspective of the domestic government if there were no tax distortions, as in the taxes versus bankruptcy-costs model. As a result, the effi ciency cost from the national perspective generated by corporate taxes on multinationals equals
(∂D/∂τ), where D represents the internal debt of the United States fi rm. Effi ciency costs here are potentially much greater than for domestic fi rms because behavior is more responsive to taxes, the behavioral response does not generate additional interest income taxable under the personal income tax, and the change in the corporate tax rate needed in order to eliminate any distortions (from the United States perspective) equals τ US rather than τ US -m.
The economic considerations are then very different when considering tax effects on the behavior of multinationals versus domestic fi rms. Rather than trading off the effects on each class of fi rm when setting the corporate tax schedule, it is better to have additional instruments to deal separately with multinationals. Effi ciency costs from the distortion to fi nancial policy of multinationals would be entirely avoided (from the domestic perspective) when interest payments are not deductible under the corporate tax. While no country has modifi ed their corporate tax to eliminate entirely the distortions faced by multinationals, the United States does have two provisions that at least reduce its effi ciency costs.
Consider fi rst the interest allocations rule. Under this provision, interest payments made by a U.S. fi rm are allocated across all the subsidiaries of the multinational in proportion to the capital stock of each subsidiary. Rather than receiving tax deductions of iτ US D, immediate deductions instead are reduced to αiτ US D, where α is the fraction of the fi rm's capital located in the United States. If the fi rm is in an excess credit position, there are no further tax benefi ts from borrowing by the U.S. fi rm, so that the effi ciency costs from the tax distortions to debt for this fi rm are reduced by α 2 . If instead the fi rm is in a defi cit credit position, then the interest deductions allocated to the foreign subsidiaries will reduce domestic taxable income due when profi ts are eventually repatriated. Due to deferral, receiving these deductions at a later date is not as valuable as receiving them immediately. Tax distortions are then still reduced, but not by as much as for fi rms in an excess credit position.
Subpart F rules come into play when the foreign subsidiary not only has less debt than the U.S. fi rm but in fact has positive holdings of interest-bearing assets. Without subpart F rules, the tax savings when a U.S. fi rm borrows from a foreign subsidiary remain the same, regardless of the sign of the subsidiary's net holdings of interest-bearing securities. With subpart F rules, though, the interest income on positive holdings of interest-bearing securities is immediately taxable in the United States. Taxes are still paid abroad on this interest income, resulting on net in a tax loss from use of debt when subpart F applies. 31 As a result, this provision places a ceiling on the feasible extent of tax arbitrage through use of debt.
In spite of the presence of these extra provisions, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) still estimate that borrowing decisions by U.S. multinationals are very responsive to relative tax rates. This additional consideration therefore makes it more costly to use the corporate tax as a tool to alleviate lemons problems faced by domestic fi rms in the credit market.
VIII. SUMMARY
There is a huge academic literature investigating how taxes affect corporate use of debt. When companies borrow, their corporate tax liabilities fall due to the resulting interest deductions. Those fi nancing the fi rm, though, may well face personal taxes on the resulting interest income. The tax law subsidizes debt fi nance to the extent that the resulting fall in corporate tax liabilities exceeds the resulting extra taxes paid on this interest income under the personal tax.
How important have these tax incentives been in practice, and how responsive have investors been to these incentives? What have been the resulting effi ciency costs from these distortions to market incentives?
The most recent empirical evidence suggests that the tax incentives to borrow are often large. Graham (2000) reports that large U.S. corporations could save on average at least 11.6 percent of fi rm value in the combined tax liabilities of the fi rm and shareholders through use of debt. These large tax distortions encouraging more debt, however, have had only modest effects on use of debt fi nance. The estimates suggest that the tax incentives observed over time in the United States have been suffi cient to induce fi rms to increase the fraction of capital fi nanced with debt by up to 4.7 percentage points, relative to a mean of 26 percent.
The remaining debate revolves around how to infer the effi ciency effects of such changes to corporate fi nancial choices. The standard presumption has been that corporations would choose the effi cient use of debt, ignoring taxes, so that any tax distortion results in effi ciency costs. Based on this starting point, the overall excess burden from the tax distortion to fi nancial choices is well under one percent of overall corporate tax revenue.
This standard presumption that corporations would choose the effi cient use of debt, ignoring taxes, has often been questioned in the recent academic literature, however.
While Graham argues that large U.S. fi rms could have saved at least 11.6 percent of fi rm value in taxes, he fi nds that they in fact saved only 4.3 percent of fi rm value in taxes. Why do some of the most profi table fi rms borrow so little, given the large foregone tax savings that would result from any interest deductions? Why do fi rms with tax losses, where taxes discourage borrowing, nonetheless borrow as much as they do?
A commonly proposed answer in the academic literature is that fi rms borrow relatively little on average because of lemons problems in the loan market. Lenders cannot easily distinguish between good and bad fi rms, so must set one interest rate for both. At this interest rate, bad fi rms can easily fi nd it attractive to borrow, since they often do not end up repaying the debt. Good fi rms, in contrast, may well fi nd the interest rate too high to justify borrowing. Consistent with this hypothesis, the evidence shows that a fi rm's share price falls when it unexpectedly chooses to borrow. With such a lemons problem, good fi rms face a cost of capital in the bond market above that faced by bad fi rms. Investment is then misallocated, with too little investment in the good fi rms.
The tax law can, and to some degree has, been designed to alleviate the resulting misallocations. To do so, it should encourage borrowing by good fi rms, who borrow too little on effi ciency grounds, and perhaps even discourage borrowing by bad fi rms. The current law does this in part through no-loss-offset provisions, which prevent a fi rm with tax losses from saving on taxes through additional interest deductions. The progressive corporate tax schedule also encourages profi table fi rms to borrow, while potentially discouraging unprofi table fi rms from borrowing. In both cases, these differential incentives on good versus bad fi rms help alleviate the misallocations that result from lemons problems in the loan market.
While there is suggestive empirical evidence in support of this lemons model, direct evidence on the implied misallocation of capital is limited. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) fi nd evidence that small fi rms with high market values relative to their book values rely primarily on retained earnings for additional investment, consistent with the hypothesis that good fi rms fi nd the interest rate on corporate loans too high to be attractive. The observed variation in market to book values for the fi rms in their sample is substantial. If the marginal return on additional investment is linked to the average value of the fi rm's existing capital, then their evidence implies substantial variation in the marginal products of capital as well. This type of evidence provides the most support for the importance of the corrective measures under the tax law laid out in this paper.
